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

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CHANGING PATTERNS OF THE MILITARY INSTITUTION

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Management.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

CHANGING PATTERNS OF THE MILITARY INSTITUTION

An analysis of the United States Military is conducted by examining the institution and the organizational structure through the conceptual framework of two models. In the first part of the study it is suggested that the United States Military is moving from a "total institution" model to a more civilianized "employer-employee" model. The emergence of the new model may be viewed as a precursor to unionization of the Armed Forces. The organization is also examined in the light of J. D. Thompson's organizational model which is essentially a synthesis of open and closed-system theory. Organizational health is maintained by protecting the inner core from the environment. This function is performed by peripheral support agencies which act as buffers between the core and the environment. The model suggests that a functional bifurcation between the core and support units should be formalized. A distribution of the various services between the core and support is presented. Corollaries of the models may have an impact on current issues. In the last section of the study two of the current issues are addressed; unionization and the expanding role of women. The author suggests that union activities be restricted to support units. Furthermore, there are indications that diminishing human resources will necessitate the use of women in combat units.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States Military is now experiencing tremendous institutional stress. This stress at times has become acute, and there is evidence that it will continue into the immediate future. What has precipitated this stress? In a word, it is change. One does not have to look far to see evidence of change in the military. A quick survey of the newspapers and periodicals which deal with the military will provide numerous indications that forces for change are at work. Furthermore, these forces for change are operating both inside and outside the military. What at one time was a very closed system has become very open, and it is this openness that is accelerating the ever-increasing rate of change. One wonders if the institution and its members are not experiencing what Alvin Toffler has coined "Future Shock....the shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in individuals by subjecting them to too much change in too short a time."[1] (Toffler p 2)

To say that the military is in a state of change implies that it is changing <u>from</u> something <u>to</u> something. This, then, is the focus and purpose of this paper. It is my belief that the changes we are now experiencing can be better understood when placed in the conceptual framework of a model.

What I propose, therefore, is to examine the military in terms of different models and suggest those which I believe most accurately describe what the military is today. Initially, the locus of analysis is the institution itself. Later, I will shift the locus to the organization.[2] Toward the end of the paper I will address two of the most pressing issues facing the military today--unionization and the expanding role of women.

The post-WW II technology explosion and the painful Vietnam experience have exerted tremendous pressures for change. Pressures generated outside as well as inside the military have necessitated rapid adaptation by the organization. Unfortunately, there is growing evidence that the adaptive processes inherent to the organization have not been able to cope. As a result, there has been some loss of confidence--both within the military and outside--that it can overcome the difficulties and chart its own course for the future. Metaphorically, one might view the military as a traveler who has just entered a high speed highway without a map on hand or a clear destination in mind. The old cliché of being "overtaken by events" or reacting to the situation rather than anticipating it seems appropriate. To use the metaphor again, models can provide some kind of map which may indicate alternate routes, if not the best route. The question of ultimate destination is beyond the model and, as suggested by the metaphor, must be clearly identified by those

in the "driver's seat." Hopefully, clear mission statements beyond the amorphous "Defense of the Nation" will be forthcoming. This paper is not intended to address the issue of what the purposes of the military are but, rather, what form it is taking. Some may be quick to point out that in reality you cannot separate these two elements, and I might agree. However, for purposes of this paper, in the abstract, I am making a conceptual distinction.

There is a voluminous amount of literature available on the issues I am addressing here. A comprehensive bibliography would be a study unto itself.[3] Therefore, I have provided a selected bibliography. I have cited all direct quotes; however, many of the ideas presented here owe their origins to the various authors listed in the bibliography. In the interest of brevity I have not given full credit to all my colleagues though it is most assuredly due. I, therefore, apologize for all omissions and commissions.

CHAPTER II

THE INSTITUTIONAL MODELS

> Socially, the pre-World War II military was a self-contained institution with marked separation from civilian society. In its essential qualities, the "From-Here-To-Eternity" Army was a garrison force predicated upon military tradition, ceremony, hierarchy, and authority.[1]

In essence the military institution of the pre-World War II period was a "total institution," --"a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situation individuals, cut off from a wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life."[2] The boundaries around the military of this period were relatively impermeable. There was a clear distinction between the civilian population and the military. There was a formally prescribed method of entering the military which has been described as a "rite-of-passage." Within the institution the "intensive technology" of the military organization was used to transform batches of socially heterogeneous individuals into relatively homogeneous groups. This process of transformation can most accurately be described as a socialization process.[3] One may look on the military of this period as a relatively small core. Members of the core were insulated from the outside environment by geographical separation and institutional boundaries; member needs were provided for within the institution. The "zone-of-indifference" for this group was extensive.[4]

The outbreak of World War II and the subsequent enormous growth experienced by the military fundamentally changed the military institution. The explosive expansion of the core essentially militarized a large segment of the civilian society. Thus, large numbers of civilians and functions normally performed by civilians were taken en masse into the military.

The military was totally dependent on the civilians for manpower, materiel, and moral support. Likewise, with the introduction of massive bombing raids, civilians shared the fears and horrors of battle once limited to the soldiers on the battlefield. The mass citizen army was no longer an autonomous institution, separated by impenetrable boundaries, independent from and impervious to the rest of society. A merging process had taken place which has profoundly affected the military. Values and ideology, once thought to be outside the military, began to appear within the very fabric of military organization. Many of the military organizational practices and social distinctions, once thought impervious to change, came under sharp criticism....much of it from the many citizen soldiers leaving the military. Their anger centered on injustices which they endured as lower members of the organization. As a result of the numerous complaints, official action was taken, and a board was established to look into the alleged injustices. This board was known as "The Doolittle Board."

> The Board was directed in a memorandum dated March 18, 1946, to study officer-enlisted man relationships and to make recommendations to the Secretary of War as to changes in existing practices, laws, regulations, etc., which are considered necessary or desirable in order to improve relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel.[5]

Two of the areas in which recommendations for changes were made, were in the military justice system and the techniques of leadership (techniques of control) used by officers in positions of authority. Furthermore, it appears that the intent of the board was to change the military institution itself by eliminating many of the social distinctions between officers and enlisted men. To what degree the intent was realized has been a matter of interest and debate for many. Some authors have viewed the existence of the Doolittle Board as an effort at cooptation.[6]

The contraction of the military in the post-war period, coupled with the Korean War and "Cold War" of the Fifties, extended the total institution model; however, significant inroads had been made to open up the military. The phenomenal growth of technology, both inside and outside the military, precipitated rapid change in the authority structure. "Following the Korean War there was a movement away from the military system based on traditional authority to one placing greater stress on persuasion and individual incentive."[7] Those military services which were most heavily dependent on

technology moved away from the traditional total institution model.

The military had undergone extensive changes in its occupational structure, due to the ". . . revolution in technology that has affected the structure of society no less than it has the military establishment."[8] The rapid rise of reliance on technical expertise weakened the hierarchical authority of the military organization.[9] The tremendous increase in the number of men allocated to technical functions provides an indication of the impact technology has had.

> The need in the military establishment for unskilled manpower has decreased rapidly and the demand for technically competent manpower increased correspondingly . . . . *These requirements have produced* a marked shift in the occupational structure of the armed forces in the direction of increased jobs in the electronics, technical, and repair fields . . . , which together accounted for 34% of all jobs at the end of World War II, for 39% during the Korean conflict, and for 47% by the end of 1958. Most of this gain was at the expense of ground combat assignments, which dropped during this same period from 24% to 13% of all enlisted jobs.[10]

The introduction of large numbers of specialists has fundamentally altered the military. These men perform tasks which require extensive training programs. Large amounts of time and money are invested in their education; and, as a result, they are not so easily replaced as the relatively unskilled soldiers of the past. Furthermore, a higher level of intelligence is required of the basic recruits in order to insure a sufficient quantity of men to train as specialists.

This means, more than ever, that the military must compete with civilian industry for its manpower sources. In order to be competitive, the military is being forced to present a more "civilianized" image of itself. This situation is even more evident since the draft laws were abolished, and the military has been forced to compete in the "market place," so to speak, on an even footing with industry.[11] Furthermore, the problem does not end once the man is a trained and functioning soldier. The question then becomes one of retention. To this end the military is offering enormous sums of money, sometimes as much as $10,000.00, in attempts to retain highly skilled men. However, even this incentive does not always keep a highly trained soldier in. All of these factors have tended to focus attention on the lower ranks and have brought about a new "sensitivity" on the part of the senior members toward the lower ones. In a sense, then, we may say a dependency relationship exists, more than ever before, between the different levels of the organization. This dependency relationship may be viewed as a diffusion of power.[12] And this diffusion of power could be construed as pluralism; hence, a basis for democratic type activities.[13]

Without going to an extreme, I believe there is evidence that the military has gone through a "democratization" process akin to that which has been described by Warren G. Bennis:

> What we have in mind when we use the term "democracy" is not permissiveness or laissez faire, but a system of values a "climate of beliefs"

governing behavior - which people are internally compelled to affirm by deeds as well as words. These values include:

1. Full and free communication, regardless of rank and power.

2. A reliance on consensus, rather than on the more customary forms of coercion or compromise, to manage conflict.

3. The idea that influence is based on technical competence and knowledge rather than on the vagaries of personal whims or prerogatives of power.

4. An atmosphere that permits and even encourages emotional expression as well as task-oriented acts.

5. A basically human bias, one which accepts the inevitability of conflict between the organization and the individual but which is willing to cope with and mediate this conflict on rational grounds.

Changes along these dimensions are being promoted widely in American industry. Most important, for analysis, is what we believe to be the reason for these changes: Democracy becomes a functional necessity whenever a social system is competing for survival under conditions of chronic change.[14] (Emphasis mine.)

The technological revolution, with its prolification of skill, has also brought new dimensions to the military.

> Since the Civil War, the relative percentage of purely military or combat occupational specialties in the services has decreased markedly and civilian-type occupations--both for enlisted and officer specialties--has increased correspondingly at a rapid rate. (See Table 1.)
>
> The presence of over a million civilians, as well as 32,000 women, in uniform is further evidence of this trend toward the "civilianization" of specializations within the services. Another indication of this trend is the extent to which many functions in the services, usually performed by men in uniform, are now being contracted to firms employing civilians.[15] (Emphasis mine.)

TABLE I

OCCUPATION GROUPINGS FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL[16]

Item and Branch of Service		Civil War	Spanish-American War	World War I	World War II	Korean conflict	Vietnam conflict
Enlisted personnel:							
Occupation groupings.....	percent	[1] 100.00	[2] 100.0	[3] 100.00	[4] 100.0	[5] 100.0	[6] 100.0
Technical and scientific..	"	0.15	0.52	3.66	10.4	12.7	22.1
Administrative and clerical.....	"	0.73	3.13	7.99	12.6	18.1	14.7
Mechanics and repairmen...	"	0.10	0.95	8.49	16.6	15.3	18.6
Craftsmen.....	"	0.50	0.14	13.03	5.9	4.7	5.9
Service workers.....	"	2.41	6.49	12.52	9.6	12.4	13.0
Operatives and laborers...	"	2.91	2.18	20.20	6.1	6.5	7.4
Military-type occupations not elsewhere classified.....	"	93.20	86.59	34.11	38.8	30.3	18.3

[1]Covers only Army personnel base of 1,908,800.

[2]Covers only Army personnel base of 246,410.

[3]Covers only Army personnel base of 3,665,000.

[4]Covers all services base of 9,370,986.

[5]Covers all services base of 4,428,939.

[6]Covers all services base of 2,980,666.

Source: The President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions, Veterans' Benefits in the United States, vol. I, 1956; and U.S. Dept. of Defense, Office of the Secretary, unpublished data.

The fact that many civilian skills can be directly translated into the military, has resulted in the assimilation of civilians during times of need. Examples of this are especially evident in the highly technical and specialized areas; such as, aircraft maintenance and complex weapons systems.[17] The presence of civilians within the organization--though not really full members--has had its effect.

> Military leaders must share authority with civilian scientists as technology becomes more and more complex and the influx of civilians into officer corps during periods of mobilization undermined traditional forms of authority and command. (Emphasis mine.)[18]

The introduction of large numbers of civilians into the military seems to be a growing trend. Efforts to maintain an all-volunteer force have fostered attempts to transfer many "non-military" functions or duties over to civilians.

It would seem that the presence of large numbers of civilians--who are not subject to the same rules and authority structure as military men--may represent a new force within the institution. The rights and privileges they enjoy as civilian laborers; such as, freedom from harassment of any kind during their off-duty time, could be a source of irritation to their military counterparts, who are often required to perform additional duties in their "off-time." In short, the growing number of civilians within the organization is changing the military's "appearance" to that of civilian industry.

It is precisely this change of "appearance" and its perception by members of the military, especially recent accessions, which leads me to believe that the traditional total institution model is being replaced by a civilian type "employer-employee" model. A key element of this transformation is the role compensation plays in reinforcing one model or the other. I suggest the following hypothesis: the more military personnel perceive their pay as a "wage," the more likely the employer-employee model will dominate. Implicit in this hypothesis is a distinction between military compensation and a civilian wage. Under the former, numerous benefits are subsumed with the institution providing for many of the member's needs. In this case, there are few discretionary funds available for the member to meet his needs outside the institution. "Military families feel an indirect pressure to use base housing, the commissary and the exchange because this is part of their 'pay' and is described as such."[19] In the latter case, members are provided discretionary funds in lieu of services. Thus, the exchange between the member and the institution is limited to productivity and dollars.

At the risk of making a gratuitous assumption I submit that there is evidence that a growing number of military personnel perceive their pay as a wage similar to what their civilian counterparts receive. Thus, the military institution, to a large extent, can best be described in terms of the employer-employee model. There are numerous corollaries if one accepts this model as an accurate representation of reality.

> Noted sociologist Charles Moskos analyzes the American military in terms of three traditional models: an occupation, a profession, and a calling. In an occupation, monetary rewards are received for basic skills. First priority is to one's self interest rather than to the task itself; the form of advancement is via the trade union. . . . a calling is based on institutional values which transcend individual self-interest in favor of higher good. In the military services, these values are duty, honor, country. Associated with notions of self-sacrifice and dedication to one's role, a calling enjoys high esteem but does not necessarily command a comparable monetary reward.
>
> Moskos sees the trend in the military as the decline of the institutional model and ascendancy of the occupational model.[20]

The locus of analysis for this section has been the military institution. The models which I have applied are rather broad and must be seen as such. To say that the dominant model is the employer-employee model is not the same as saying it is the only model. I do not believe this is an either/or situation but, rather, a question of degree. With regard to the issue of convergence or divergence, it appears to me that at the institutional level the dominance of the employer-employee model would suggest convergence. That is, " . . . administrative mechanisms, social forms, and definitions of professionalism of the military are becoming more like those of all institutions in a modern complex society."[21] There are indications, however, that a relatively small element of the military--the combat core--is diverging from society. It is difficult to determine, however, if this apparent divergence is a result of the core moving away from society or the non-combat elements moving

toward society and making the core more visible. The issues involved here may become clearer as we shift our locus of analysis from the institution to the organization.

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

> In order to survive crises an organization must maintain the internal mechanisms necessary for coping with change.[1]
>
> Traditional functional organization structures, created to meet predictable, non-novel conditions, prove incapable of responding effectively to radical changes in the environment...[2]
>
> Short cuts that by-pass the hierarchy are increasingly employed in thousands of factories, offices, laboratories, even in the military.[3]
>
> The old loyalty felt by the organization man appears to be going up in smoke. In its place we are watching the rise of professional loyalty.[4]
>
> For we are witnessing not the triumph, but the breakdown of bureaucracy...[5]

The military is an extremely large, complex organization which may be viewed as a system within a larger system. It is made up of parts or sections which are interdependent and yet functionally autonomous. Certain parts of the military may be defined as more "military" than others. That which is pure military constitutes the "core" of the organization and is a relatively small portion of the total. It is the core of the military which has the combat function. If we view this core as the center (metaphorically), the agencies which radiate out from it perform supportive functions. The further the agency is located from the core, the less military--and, therefore, more civilian--it becomes. Thus, the military, as a system,

consists of supportive peripheral agencies, which are structurally flexible, clustered around a rather rigid core.

This somewhat crude description is more succinctly stated by Thompson: "...we will suggest that the phenomena associated with open- and closed-system strategies are not randomly distributed through complex organizations, but instead tend to be specialized by location."[6] This same distinction is made by Alvin Gouldner in his discussion of social systems: "...social systems may be looked upon as composed of parts having varying degrees of functional autonomy and interdependence; thus the difference between the external and internal, the 'inside' and 'outside' of the system, is not an absolute distinction, and the thickness or permeability of the system boundaries varies at different zones."[7]

The military core represents a "location" or "zone" which is relatively impervious to outside factors. The organization's unique identity, its function, is grounded in its core. This is not to say the "military" does not have other important social missions -- it does. Furthermore, one may look to the future and see an ascendance in the importance of these other missions. Resources found in the military, human as well as materiel, may well be called upon to improve the overall quality of our lives. These missions are the responsibility of agencies outside the core. Here again, we must not confuse the "core" mission with other important tasks. Within this core, (which is conceptual rather than spatio-temporal),

boundaries are placed around the members to insulate them from outside factors which may affect their ability to perform in the combat role. Closed-system strategies may be applied to this concept of core. However, as Thompson suggests, the existence of the core necessitates protective mechanisms capable of shielding it from outside variations: "...organizations try to achieve predictability and self-control through regulation of transactions at their boundaries--through negotiation, by buffering, or by varying their own activities to match fluctuations in the environment."[8] It is in this area that open-system strategies apply.

Crucial to the approach I have taken here, and in conformity with Thompson's model, is the assertion that the two views, "convergence and divergence" previously mentioned are not mutually exclusive. Peripheral agencies, which are best defined by open-system strategy, are (by definition) converging with society at large--social environment. Core agencies, which may be defined by closed-system strategy and which provide the total institution characteristics, are diverging from society. Certain "levels," "locations," "agencies," or "zones" of the organization are in the periphery, and others are in the core. In my view this constitutes the "elegance" of Thompson's approach. However, the problem of categorizing arises when conducting an analysis such as I am attempting here. The problem is further complicated when one considers that external and internal changes may dictate changes in

in size and configuration of peripheral and core agencies.

A. SUPPORT AGENCIES - The military, like other large complex organizations in our society, is trying to survive. In order to do this it must depend on the peripheral agencies to support it, and its mission, or, more appropriately, missions, must be recognized as legitimate and essential.

Under the rubric of support agencies I would consider all agencies except those with a combat mission. In the present military organization these comprise the majority. (See Table 2.) The functions performed by these agencies are too

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF POSITIONS

BY SERVICE 1977

Service	Percent of Total Combat	Non-combat	Percent of Women by Service
Army	47.8	52.2	6.6
Navy (includes Marines)	57.1[a]	42.9	4.5
Air Force	12.6	87.4	6.9

[a]Includes all shipboard duty. (Note.- Number of ships in active fleet for 1975 - combatant ships 373; auxiliary ships 123).

[b]Source: Lecture at Naval War College, 2 November 1977

numerous to list here; however, they range from the outer extremes--such as, induction centers and research laboratories--

to the inner agencies, such as maintenance and logistics units. Large numbers of civilians are enmeshed in these agencies, and the skills required are often directly convertible to the civilian community. (See Table 3.) It is in this zone that

TABLE 3

ACTIVE-DUTY PERSONNEL SAYING THEIR MILITARY TRAINING WILL BE OF "CONSIDERABLE USE" IN CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT[9]

Service	Officers %	Officers N	Enlisted Men %	Enlisted Men N
Army	46.2	(7,232)	27.7	(28,239)
Navy	47.5	(4,565)	40.6	(17,842)
Air Force	46.4	(9,650)	41.0	(28,442)
Marine Corps	46.2	(1,230)	29.4	(5,082)

Source: 1964 NORC Survey.

the exchange of resources takes place and boundaries are nebulous and extremely fluid. Human resources are pursued in a competitive market where they are recruited by specialists and inducted through Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES). These stations are "vestibules" located at the border of two institutional complexes. Further processing of the basic resource takes place at training centers, where the raw recruit is made acceptable for entry to the core units. One might assume the length of basic training is an indication or

the socialization required for entry. (See Table 4.)

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF WEEKS REQUIRED

FOR BASIC TRAINING[10]

Service	Weeks
Air Force	6
Navy	9
Army	7
Marine Corps	11

Exit agencies, such as "Project Transition," prepare the human resources for their re-entry to the outside environment.[11] At this extreme, the Veterans Administration is the last step in "out-processing."

These agencies, when placed in the context of Thompson's model, function as "buffers" and "levelers" designed to protect the core. The requirement for an all-volunteer military, coupled with public hostility toward the military, has resulted in the tremendous expansion of recruiting and public relations agencies. Survival of the organization, under current law, requires that these agencies secure an adequate share of the resources. Recruiting techniques which are typical of civilian industry are being employed by the military, thus lending support to the claims of convergence.

It appears to me that it is the interpenetration of society and the military which gives credence to the idea of convergence. This is a crucial issue when we consider core agencies. The argument here is that current conditions are conducive to the creation of impenetrable boundaries around the military's core agencies.

> The trend towards civilianization of the military is temporarily arrested as the military seeks to assert and maintain its organizational identity.[12]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> But with the advent of an all-volunteer system, the military will develop more clear-cut boundaries and dangers of social isolation and political particularism.[13]

B. CORE UNITS - Located in the core are the combat units. This is the inner area where efforts are made to maintain a purity of thought and action. Military expertise dominates, and traditional military values are prized. Often, these units are located in areas which are geographically remote from the rest of society. Constant training, to sharpen military skills, is the order of the day. Among the services, there is variation in the size of these units. There is also variation within each service. In the Army, for example, the "hard-core" units may be said to consist of Paratroopers and elite Rangers.

As previously mentioned, protective mechanisms have been established by the organization to insulate the core from the outside environment--the society at large. "The phenomena we will be dealing with therefore are to be found in those components of an organization which are most protected from

environmental influences, the technical core." (Emphasis mine.)[14]

Activities which take place here are explained by public information officers so that the public does not "misunderstand" or "misinterpret." Often, there is a paucity of detailed information available to the public. Stark replies, such as: "a training exercise was conducted..." or "national security does not permit...," serve to create protective boundaries. However, the constant flow of personnel through the military has, in the past, insured a certain amount of penetration of the core. Individuals who were not totally committed to the organization, both enlisted and officers, have not been hesitant about challenging the system, thus exposing the core to public scrutiny. This situation, however, has changed. Congressional action has contributed to the solidification of the core boundaries. The requirement to reduce the size of the military and to operate as an all-volunteer organization has, in a sense, "purged" the military of the malcontents. Obviously, this must be viewed in ordinal terms rather than nominal.

The forced reduction in the size of the officer corps has permitted the military to select those it will retain. Most of the officers released from active duty were reservists. In addition, a large number of "poor" performers were also released. The key issue here is the means used to identify poor performers. One of the means utilized, if not the only one, was the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). It can be assumed that many of those

identified as poor performers by low OER ratings were, in fact, poor performers. However, some of them were given low OER ratings because of their readiness to question the system. Thus, the reduction in force has, in effect, "purified" the officer corps.[15]

The establishment of an all-volunteer military has had somewhat the same effect. In this case, however, the selection process has not been made from within the military; but, rather, it has been a function of the external environment. The combination of low public esteem (for the military) and a competitive job market has severely limited the number and quality of human resources willing to serve. As a result, there is little chance that those who would most likely question the military will ever become a part of the organization. Compliant enlisted men (if they are not compliant they are "fired") during times of peace may contribute to the thickness of the boundaries. Previous distinctions made between the military's organization during times of peace and war may no longer be valid.

> Military organizations supply a typical example. Their tasks and compliance structures in peace and war are so different that for many purposes, especially static comparison, it is more convenient to regard them as two distinct types of organizations...In peace time, the military task is maintenance of preparedness over a long period...Compliance in this period tends to be quite coercive for draftees and highly utilitarian for the permanent staff.[16]

Arguments for and against the all-volunteer concept have been made by others and are not properly within the scope of

this paper.[17] What I have suggested, however, are consequences which may be evaluated from an organizational perspective.

There is evidence that when the military is viewed in terms of a functional bifurcation (as suggested by the Thompson model) the various services can be positioned more or less in terms of the support/core functions. (See Table 5.)

TABLE 5

THE SUPPORT/CORE CONTINUUM

Service[a]	Civilian	Support	Core	
Air Force	[b]	80-85%	10-15%	(includes pilots)
Navy		70-75%	25-30%	(includes combatant ships and pilots)
Army		50-55%	45-50%	(includes Division Units)
Marines		30-35%	65-70%	(includes Division Units and pilots)

[a] 1976 totals

[b] Half inch equals 100,000 people

The positioning I have used is admittedly arbitrary and open to debate. However, I believe there are indicators which lend some support to what I have presented. For example, the perceptions of personnel may be an indicator. Table 3 indicates

that officers, more than enlisted men, perceive their military training as being of "considerable use" in civilian employment. This suggests the following hypothesis: the more personnel in a service who perceive their training as civilian related, the smaller the percentage of that service which would be considered part of the core. Another hypothesis might be: the higher the percentage of officers in a service, the smaller the percentage of that service which would be considered part of the core. (See Table 6.)

TABLE 6

MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY BY SERVICE: 1970 to 1976[18]

Branch of Service	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	
Total----	3,066	2,714	2,322	2,252	2,161	2,127	2,087	%
Female-----	41	43	45	55	75	97	111	
Army-------	1,322	1,124	811	801	783	784	782	
Officers-	166	149	121	116	106	103	98	13
Enlisted-	1,156	975	690	685	677	681	684	87
Navy-------	692	623	588	564	546	535	525	
Officers-	81	74	73	70	67	65	64	12
Enlisted	612	549	515	494	479	470	461	88
Marine Corps	260	212	198	196	189	196	196	
Officers-	25	22	20	19	19	19	19	10
Enlisted-	235	190	178	177	170	177	177	90
Air Force--	791	755	726	691	644	612	584	
Officers-	130	126	121	115	110	105	100	17
Enlisted-	662	629	604	576	534	507	484	83

In thousands. As of June 30. Includes National Guard, Reserve, and retired Regular personnel on extended or continuous active duty; excludes Coast Guard. Warrant Officers and flight officers included under officers; military cadets, Naval Academy midshipmen, Air Force Academy cadets, and other officer candidates under enlisted personnel. See also Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series Y904-916.
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the United States Government, annual.

Another indication of perception is behavior. It would seem that units which are furthest removed from the civilian environment--the core units--would more likely be perceived as undesirable. Absent-without-leave (AWOL) and reenlistment rates may be used as indicators of individuals' perceptions. (See Tables 7 and 8.)

TABLE 7

MILITARY PERSONNEL--DESERTION AND ABSENT-WITHOUT AUTHORITY RATES: 1970 to 1975[19]

	Desertion[1]					Absent Without Authority[2]				
Years	Total	Army	Marine Corps	Navy	Air Force	Total	Army	Marine Corps	Navy	Air Force
1970[3]	25.8	52.3	59.6	9.9	0.8	66.3	132.5	174.3	17.5	5.9
1971	33.9	73.5	56.2	11.1	1.5	84.0	176.9	166.6	19.0	9.4
1972	27.5	62.0	65.3	8.8	2.8	74.9	166.4	170.0	18.3	17.2
1973	24.6	52.0	63.2	13.6	2.2	77.0	159.0	234.3	21.7	16.1
1974	25.0	41.2	89.2	21.2	2.4	79.5	130.0	287.5	53.8	17.3
1975	22.4	26.8	105.0	22.4	1.9	73.7	95.4	300.9	73.0	13.0

[1]Absent without authority more than 30 days. [2]For 30 days or less.
[3]Calendar year.
Rate per 1,000 average end-of-month strength. For years ending June 30.
Source of table U.S. Dept. of Defense, Office of the Secretary, Selected Manpower Statistics, annual, and unpublished data.

These tables tend to put the Air Force and Navy together with the Air Force being the more desirable service. There is also an indication that the Army and Marine Corps could be grouped together.

TABLE 8

ENLISTED MILITARY PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT: 1960 to 1975[20]
(In Thousands, for year ending June 30)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
ARMY[1]	573	576	637	539	472	414	239	279	264
Inductions	318	299	334	254	199	156	27	36	a
First enlistments	170	190	144	201	177	158	160	179	185
Reenlistments	84 (15%)	84 (15%)	85 (13%)	78 (14%)	93 (20%)	98 (24%)	49 (21%)	62 (22%)	77 (29%)
NAVY[1,2]	223	188	195	212	164	146	153	171	156
First enlistments	143	101	123	147	100	79	89	99	84
Reenlistments	42 (19%)	44 (23%)	39 (20%)	37 (17%)	41 (25%)	41 (28%)	43 (28%)	53 (31%)	53 (34%)
MARINE CORPS[1,2]	113	85	111	107	87	71	67	67	62
First enlistments	69	71	93	84	68	59	56	52	47
Reenlistments	11 (10%)	9 (11%)	9 (8%)	10 (9%)	8 (9%)	10 (14%)	11 (16%)	14 (21%)	15 (24%)
AIR FORCE[1]	253	186	182	206	148	173	173	172	143
First enlistments	166	121	98	122	78	101	91	98	75
Reenlistments	87 (34%)	65 (35%)	69 (38%)	83 (40%)	70 (47%)	72 (42%)	81 (47%)	74 (43%)	67 (47%)

[a]Less than 500 or 0.5 percent. [1]Includes Reserve to active duty. [2]Includes inductions not shown separately, as follows: Navy, 1966, 3,000; Marine Corps, 1966, 20,000; 1968, 5,000; 1969, 11,000; 1970, 8,000.

Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Office of the Secretary, Selected Manpower Statistics, annual.

In order to survive in time of peace, the military organization must attract and retain a sufficient quantity and quality of personnel. In an all-volunteer environment it may be necessary to significantly reduce the percentage of the organization in the core or make the core less military.

Thompson's model, as I have presented it here, is actually a synthesis of closed and open-system theory. The characteristics of the Weberian bureaucratic model, which is essentially oriented toward efficiency and the rational decision process, are more appropriate in the core.[21] An open-system approach which is oriented toward survival of the organization is applicable in the periphery or support agencies. It seems that during times of peace and especially during periods of austere budgets, the survival model dominates. Inevitably, this is a source of considerable internal conflict as priorities have to be established. Satisfactory rather than optimum solutions become the norm. Personnel who perceive the organization primarily in terms of the core quickly become frustrated. Crucial issues concerning the health of the organization become distorted as individuals address them within a frame of reference which reflects a model that may not be applicable given the situation. Two of the current issues are unionization and the role of women in the military. In the next section I will address these in light of the models just presented.

CHAPTER IV

CURRENT ISSUES

A. UNIONIZATION

One need only make a cursory examination of the current periodicals to know that there are many, both inside and outside the military, who are concerned about unionization.[1] Most of what has been published is firmly opposed to members of the American military joining a union. The key arguments tend to center on the issues of authority and combat effectiveness. I submit that the issue is not whether or not unions should be allowed in the military but, rather, whether or not the military will unionize, and, if so, what form is it likely to take.

The models previously presented suggest a trend toward civilianization of the military. A stabilized world situation diminishes the perceived importance of the core units. Austere budgets will force reductions in various programs. Quality of life programs, especially personnel services, may be cut in favor of expensive technical hardware. The reaction of military members to these convergent trends suggests unification to insure that their personal and social interests are protected. There are currently numerous associations which have grown in size and strength in the military. (For example, the Association of the United States Army - AUSA.) These associations, though clearly not unions, do perform some functions

traditionally attributed to unions. They represent a common interest and present a collective voice on key issues which are important to their members. The emergence of these associations indicates a perceived need for them, or they would not grow as rapidly as they have. It is my belief that these associations will continue to grow and assume more and more the role traditionally played by unions.

An excellent discussion of the "convergence of unions and associations" is presented by Jack Stieber in his book Public Employee Unionism: Structure, Growth, Policy.

> When research for this study began in 1968, state and local government employees appeared to be organized into two distinctly different types of organizations: unions and associations. Unions were organizations of workers as distinct from managers, executives, and elected officials (the line between management and workers was blurred, however, and supervisory employees were accorded full membership rights). Associations, in contrast, were open to all employees within specified government jurisdictions, occupations, or professions without regard to hierarchical status.[2]
>
> . . . .
>
> By the end of 1972, many of the distinguishing features of unions and associations in state and local government had blurred or disappeared.[3]

If, however, there is unionization I believe it will be strongest in those units outside the core. With that in mind, contingency plans could be made which would limit the impact a union might have. For example, the functional bifurcation previously described could be formalized and union membership be restricted to support units. Thus, military personnel would be required to give up active union membership when assigned

to a core unit. This would insure that traditional authority structures essential to combat units would not be interfered with. Some have argued that such an approach would not work; "If only combat support forces were organized, who would supply and administer combat forces in the event of wildcat 'sickout' by the union members in these support forces"?[4] One could insure, through law, that all union activities be suspended during war. This would preclude interference from union organizations during combat operations.

Many government employees who provide varying degrees of support to the military belong to unions. Many National Guard technicians and reservists also belong to unions. Unionization has become ubiquitous throughout our society. Professional groups, such as nurses and teachers as well as policemen and firemen, have unionized to one degree or another. The forces which drove these people to seek the protection of a union are extant in the United States military today. As I previously stated, the question is not whether or not the military should unionize but, rather, whether or not it will. The indications seem clear to me. If conditions continue as they have been, unionization in some form is very likely. The more appropriate questions concern how we will deal with it. I have suggested an approach which may be taken. Formalization of the functional bifurcation may serve other purposes as well. For example, service in core units could be weighted to give extra credit for retirement.[5]

Several alternatives have been proposed to insure that the military has a sufficient number of qualified personnel. One of them, universal military (government) service, may reduce the likelihood of unionization. The large number of people entering and leaving the service would make it difficult to organize a union. Furthermore, these large numbers would have to be paid a stipend, rather than a full pay. Their needs would be met, for the most part, by the institution on military bases. This would tend to reduce the "employer-employee" model in favor of the "total institution." In my opinion, this model would not be conducive to unionization.

On the other hand, the other alternatives--namely, civilian contract support and increasing the number of women in a relatively small military--would, most likely, continue the trend toward unionization. Table 9 suggests a trend toward civilian contract hire.

TABLE 9

YEAR-END MANPOWER STRENGTHS[6]
(In thousandths)

Fiscal Year	Total Strength[a] Uniformed & Civilian	Percent Contract Hire[b]	
1956	4475	% 4	199 (N)
1960	3967	7	266
1964	4076	5	219
1968	5386	7	402
1972	3910	10	394
1976	3638	13	455
1978[c]	3707	15	536

[a] Source: Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 1976.

[b] Source: Richard V.L. Cooper, Contract-Hire Personnel in the Department of Defense, The Rand Corporation, P-5864, Santa Monica, California, May 1975, column (7), table 6.

[c] Estimates based on Budget of the U.S. Government: 1978.

B. WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

> The hypothesis is then true that the talents and capabilities of women are such, and the opportunities for the implementation of these traits exist to the extent that, there should be no barriers to the utilization of service women except those that are inherent within the individual. (Emphasis mine.)[7]

. . . . .

> In the area of the laws which discriminate against servicewomen, it is suggested that the present restrictions against women be removed. This would in essence remove the barriers to women in combat....(Emphasis mine.)[8]

The above quotes from a thesis done by James A. Tamplin, Jr. echo many of the aspirations and hopes of women in the military today. The role of women in the military is rapidly expanding. In an atmosphere of volunteerism women represent a critical resource for meeting personnel requirements of all the services. Indeed, there are clear indications that this hitherto relatively untapped resource was a key factor when the all-volunteer military was established:

> An important consideration in implementing the All-Volunteer Force was the potential trade-off between men and women; fewer men had to be enlisted. Also, because the proportion of women in the Armed Forces was much smaller than that of men, it was comparatively easy to maintain high quality standards among women entries.[9]

As suggested in earlier portions of this paper there are large areas of the armed forces where women could make a significant contribution. It would seem, in fact, that the only area where doubt remains about the role of women is in the core or combat units. It is to this issue that I will address myself

in the remainder of this paper. The quantity, if not the quality, of articles dealing with this issue has been copious to say the least.[10] For my purposes here I will assume that the laws will be changed to permit women to join combat units in all the services.[11] Given this assumption, one must address the nature of combat for the various services and attempt to determine the impact women will have on the effectiveness of the fighting units. The essence of the military is and must be grounded in its combat mission.

In general terms one can say that combat takes place in one or more of the mediums: land, sea, and air. Furthermore, since man is a land creature, combat which takes place in either the sea or the air is totally dependent on some vehicle or platform which can be defined as a machine. The Navy "fights the ship"; the Air Force "fights the aircraft." The basic element of combat in these two mediums is some form of ship or plane. The effectiveness of these vehicles, to a large extent, is determined by the proficiency of their highly trained, technically skilled crews. Technical competence of the crew is the key element to success in combat. This, then, is the first criterion which should be applied to anyone seeking duty with these combat units. In these services the vehicles themselves tend to integrate social activity. Each member of the crew has a specified job to perform, and the whole is dependent on each doing their duty. Crew integration, to a large extent, is a function of the division of labor and specialized

tasks. Once combat is encountered, survival of the whole may well depend on each crew member doing their specialized task proficiently. In this environment one could anticipate women performing well in a combat situation. As long as they met the physical and technical requirements of the duty they could be integrated as a member of a combat crew. Some have expressed reservations about placing women in a high-risk environment. In the event of thermonuclear war, this becomes a moot point. During hostilities at some reduced level, which is more likely, historical evidence suggests a somewhat lower risk in an air or sea combat environment. (See Table 10.)

TABLE 10

PERCENT OF BATTLE DEATHS BY SERVICE[12]

Period	Air Force	Navy	Army	Marines	Totals
WW I	a	b	96	4	53,000
WW II	a	13	80	7	292,000
Korea	3	b	83	13	34,000
Vietnam (Jan 1, 1961-Jan 27, 1973 - date of cease-fire)	2	2	68	28	46,000

[a]Included in Army; [b]Less than 500.

Land combat appears to present problems which are not so apparent in sea and air combat. The basic element of land combat is essentially a unit. In addition, there are critical physical differences between the land combat environment and that of the air and sea. Physical strength and endurance may be more critical in the land combat environment than in the more technically oriented sea and air. Thus, personnel assigned to land combat units must meet stringent physical standards or jeopardize overall unit effectiveness.

A key element of effectiveness for land combat units is the degree of cohesion the unit is able to achieve. The essential element of cohesion seems to be a function of primary group formation. Charles H. Cooley in his book, Social Organization (1909) defined primary groups in the following terms:

> By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social natures and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association . . . is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression.[13]

Studies done during World War II, Korea and Vietnam all indicate that primary group formation and cohesion are essential for "...units to stand up in the face of severe, prolonged stress."[14]

The authors of The American Soldier (Volume 2) concluded that the primary or informal group "served two principal functions in combat motivation: it set and emphasized group standards of behavior and it supported and sustained the individual in stresses he would otherwise not have been able to withstand."[15]

There are indications that land combat of the future may require dispersion of units throughout the battle area. More than ever, these units must be highly cohesive if they are to survive. The role of combat soldiers is unique. It would seem most nations of the world, even those hard-pressed for resources--such as Israel, have refrained from integrating women in the ground combat role.[16] This is not to say that women should not be trained to fill the role if necessary. In fact, if women are to operate within the battle area they should be prepared to defend themselves or meet other contingencies. The question here is whether or not they should habitually be assigned to a ground combat role. S. A. Stouffer et al., in the seminal work The American Soldier, succinctly state the importance of the combat role: "To put it another way, the best predictor of combat behavior is the simple fact of institutionalized role: knowing that a man is a soldier rather than a civilian."[17] In the absence of substantive data to the contrary, I am concerned that integrating women into ground combat units might adversely affect primary group formation.

> A number of investigators have noted that a common social background assists soldiers in a unit to develop intimate interpersonal relations, similarities in previous social experience--such as social class, regional origin, or age--appear to contribute in this way. Conversely, heterogeneous ethnic and national origins among soldiers within a unit tend to inhibit formation of primary group relations (Janowitz and Little, 1965; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; George, 1967).[18]

The importance of primary group formation was touched on in the Women In the Army Study prepared by the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in December, 1976. "A general theory was put forth that effective fighting groups have historically excluded women because sexual pairing within a group disrupts group loyalty and cohesion and distracts from its mission."[19]

Until extensive research is done in this area I suggest that women not be assigned to the maneuver battalions of ground combat units.[20]

One last point with regard to assignment of women to core type units: it was previously stated that the introduction of women into the military may be viewed as a civilianization of the military. (See Note 15, Chapter II.) This in itself may not have a negative impact on combat effectiveness. In fact, as stated earlier, in certain "zones" or "levels" of the organization the presence of highly qualified women may be a decided improvement. There is, however, the question of the ethos or spirit of the combat core. The combat role is unique and, by definition, the furthest from any civilian role. It is a

role into which one must be socialized. The process of socialization for combat has been in the past a difficult, demanding and stressful experience for those who pass through it. The process itself has served to set apart the combat soldiers from all others. It was functional for soldiers in the core to perceive themselves as something different--maybe even a cut above the rest. Paratroopers have traditionally carried a certain élan that set them apart. It is my belief that fighting units need a special esprit if they are to be effective under the arduous human conditions commonly found in battle.[21] Because of the importance I place on this, I believe some analysis should be done to determine the effect women may have on the esprit of combat units. There are indicators which may be a cause for concern: "The airborne was good competition to get quality people in combat arms until the WACS got wings and shattered an image."[22]

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

> I feel as if I'm on a rudderless ship, afloat without a destination, and under constant attack from people whose names will fade into fog when it comes time to blame someone. It's like a thousand actors on a stage, each with a speaking part, but with no script and no director. We just aren't organized to run our own show.[1]

The above quote from Major General Vernon B. Lewis, Jr. a few days before his retirement, poignantly summarized the purpose of this paper. Though the work here is exploratory at best, I believe the analysis is sufficient to support several tentative conclusions.

The military is completing a transition from a "total institution" model to a more civilianized "employer-employee" model. In the process of this transition the military has been opened up to the point where it is seeking its own identity. The process has been painful for many, especially the careerists in the senior enlisted ranks and some senior officers. Traditional mores associated with the military seem to be disappearing, and implied psychological contracts are perceived to be broken. These changes have brought about a degree of disaffection throughout the services. The "employer-employee" model suggests a fundamental shift to a more civilian-like value system. An important aspect of this shift is the expectations it generates among members of the military as well as

those contemplating entry. Patterns of interaction typical of civilian industry seem to be pervasive. Personnel seem to be "hired" and "fired" much like the civilian labor force. Attitudes toward AWOL (Absent-Without-Leave) emphasizes "absenteeism" and deemphasizes "without-leave." The reaction of the civilian labor force to alienation and a sense of powerlessness has been united action through unions. Rhetoric aside, there are indications that military personnel will respond to continued civilianization and perceived erosion of social support by seeking union support. Legislation against unionization will probably face a constitutional test. As previously stated, the question is not whether or not the military should unionize but, rather, whether or not it will. The model suggests that it will.

During the forthcoming period the large complex organizations which make up the Federal Bureaucracy will compete for their share of diminishing resources. In order to survive, organizations must adapt to the rapidly changing environment. The interdependence of these large systems precludes an autonomous closed-system approach. While it is true that the essence of the organization must be sustained in the core, it will become more and more difficult to accomplish this without elaborate protective mechanisms. Peripheral agencies which will actively seek out support and resources will themselves consume resources intended for the core. Like a fat person on a diet, overblown bureaucratic organizations will be forced, through

resource starvation, to reduce organizational fat. For the military, clear distinctions must be made between muscle and fat. I believe the organizational model developed by J. D. Thompson can be an effective conceptual tool for understanding the military organization.

Human resources will certainly become more and more precious. In this regard, women represent a significant portion of the high caliber people needed to sustain the military organization. As with all resources we simply cannot afford to waste their talents. I suggest that women can and will make a contribution in combat units of the armed forces. Technical competence will be the governing criterion for most assignments. There are, however, important questions which must be addressed before they are employed in the maneuver battalions of the ground combat forces.

NOTES

Chapter I

1. Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam, 1971), p. 2.

2. The conceptual distinction between institution and organization is difficult. However, I believe it can be made and it serves a useful purpose here. The definition for institution that I am using is: "An institution is an organized system of social relationships which embodies certain common values and procedures and meets certain basic needs of the society," in Sociology by Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 185. The following would apply to organization: "By organization we mean, following Parsons (1960, p. 17), social units devoted primarily to attainment of specific goals," in A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, by Amitai Etzioni (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. xi.

3. An excellent bibliography of military institutions is provided in, Roger W. Little, ed., Handbook of Military Institutions (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications).

Chapter II

1. Charles C. Moskos Jr., ed. Public Opinion and the Military Establishment (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 274.

2. Erving Goffman, "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions," Asylums (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1961), p. xiii.

3. For an excellent discussion of the socialization process see: Orville G. Brim Jr. and Stanton Wheeler, Socialization After Childhood: Two Essays (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966).

4. This concept was first developed by Chester L. Barnard. See Chester L. Barnard, "A Definition of Authority," in Reader in Bureaucracy, ed. by Robert K. Merton et al. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957).

5. U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships, S. Doc. 196, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, p. 19. (Also known as the Doolittle Report.)

6. See G. Dearborn Spindler, "The Doolittle Board and Co-optation in the Army," Social Forces, Vol. 29 (1951), pp. 305-310.

7. Moskos, p. 275.

8. Kurt Lang, "Technology and Career Management in the Military Establishment," in The New Military, ed. by Morris Janowitz (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 40.

9. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comprehensive Approach (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), p. 185.

10. Lang, p. 42.

11. Charles Walton Ackley, The Modern Military in American Society (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972), p. 327.

12. See Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," in Power in Societies, ed. by Marvin E. Olsen (London: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 46.

13. See Marvin E. Olsen, "Social Pluralism as a Basis for Democracy," in Power in Societies, pp. 182-188.

14. Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 18-19.

15. James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves, Education in the Armed Forces (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1965), p. 33.

16. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1976 (97th edition) Washington, D.C. 1976, p. 337.

17. In recent years the military has contracted civilian labor to perform highly skilled duties which are usually done by military personnel. In the Army hundreds of civilian flight instructors were used to train Army pilots. In addition, most of the maintenance performed on thousands of training aircraft was performed by civilian mechanics. The use of civilians in the maintenance area was also evident in the last days of the Vietnam War where contracted labor worked side-by-side with Army mechanics in the combat zone. There are numerous examples of this type of "fusion" taking place.

18. Morris Janowitz, "The Decline of the Mass Army," Military Review, Vol. LII (Feb., 1972), p. 13.

19. Richard F. Rosser, "A 20th Century Military Force" Military Review March 1974, p. 52.

20. Paul R. Schratz, "The Military Union Card," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1977, p. 26.

21. Moskos, p. 271.

Chapter III

1. James D. Thompson ed., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University Press, 1966), p. 41.

2. Toffler, pp. 135-136.

3. Ibid., p. 139.

4. Ibid., p. 146.

5. Ibid., p. 123.

6. James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 10.

7. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Authority in Functional Theory," in N. J. Demerath III and Richard A. Peterson ed., System, Change and Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 167.

8. Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 160.

9. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 204.

10. A clear distinction between the Air Force/Navy and the Marine Corps/Army basic training exists: "Army and Marine Corps recruit training differ from the Air Force and Navy programs because all recruits are given intensive physical conditioning and instruction in basic ground combat skills, including the use of individual weapons. These Services subscribe to the view that all male enlisted personnel must achieve a basic level of qualification in ground combat skills, and their Recruit Training curricula both provide a common core of training in these skills." See, U.S. Department of Defense Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1976, March, 1975, p. II-9.

11. Moskos, Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, p. 279.

12. Morris Janowitz, The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft: Adelphi Paper No. 94 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 5.

13. Ibid., p. 27.

14. Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 51.

15. The issue of the officer reduction in force (RIF) has been the source of some very heated debates within the military. Publications such as The Army Times and military journals have presented many of the arguments.

16. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 286.

17. The question is crucial but remains open. For a discussion of the issues see; David Syrett and Richard H. Kohn, "All-Volunteer Army: A Dialogue," Military Review June, 1972, pp. 70-79; Marmion, Harry A., The Case Against a Volunteer Army (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Morris Janowitz, The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft; David A. Rochefort, America's Volunteer Army: Prospects and Issues (Providence: Brown University, 1977); Richard V.L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, R-1450-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand, 1977).

18. Statistic Abstract of the United States 1976, p. 335.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 334.

21. For a discussion of Weber's bureaucratic model see: Max Weber, "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization: An Ideal Type Construction," in Reader in Bureaucracy, ed. by Merton; also, Richard H. Hall, "The Concepts of Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment," American Journal of Sociology (July, 1963), pp. 32-40.

Chapter IV

1. For example see; Strom Thrumond, "Military Unions: No," Military Review August 1977, pp. 44-53; David Cortright, "Unions and Democracy," Mil. Rev. August 197, pp. 35-44; Henry E. Eccles, "Military Unionization: The Central Issues," Naval War College Review Summer 1977, pp. 18-27; Charles L. Parnell, "Should Military Unionization be Permitted?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1977, pp. 21-24; "Symposium on Trade

Unionism in the Military," Armed Forces and Society Summer 1976. pp. 477-552. There have also been numerous articles in the Army Times. For an excellent discussion of military unions in other countries see; Ronald V. Grabler, "Military Unions: An Analysis of Unionization in Norway and Germany as it Relates to the United States," Unpublished thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1971 (AD-891-312).

2. Jack Stieber, Public Employee Unionism: Structure, Growth, Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 221.

3. Ibid., p. 222.

4. Thurmond, p. 50.

5. This idea has been presented by others, "Palmer also said that now may be the time to eliminate the 20-year retirement program for all military people except for those who have spent 17 of their 20 years in a combat unit." Larry Carney, "Palmer Raps Up-Or Out," Army Times, 31 October 1977, p. 3:1.

6. Cooper, p. 11.

7. James Arthur Tamplin Jr., "Women in the Military: A Question of Utilization," Unpublished Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1974 (AD/A-003 789/5GA), pp. 79-80.

8. Ibid., p. 83.

9. "New Career Opportunities Open to Women," Commanders Digest, v. 14, 8 November 1973, p. 3.

10. Numerous articles have been published in military journals and newspapers addressing this issue. For example, in the Army Times "Army to Consider Opening Close Combat Units to Women," 26 Sept. 1977, p. 21:2; "Women's War Role Confusing," 3 Oct. 1977, p. 12:3; "New Armor CMF Closed to Women," 10 Oct 1977, p. 6:3, "ARticle on Army Women Called 'Disservice,'" 30 Oct 1977, p. 15:1; "The Case Against Conscripting Women," Ibid. See also Armed Forces Journal International June, July, September, for example, see Lu Anne Levens, "Women Speak Out--About Women in Combat," Armed Forces Journal International June 1977, pp. 39-40.

11. A full discussion of the legal issues is provided by Tamplin, pp. 58-70. For an excellent review of the historical perspective on the Congressional view of women in combat see; U.S. Army, Women in the Army Study (Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Army, 1976), pp. 2-C-1-2-D-2.

12. Statistic Abstract of the United States: 1976, p. 337.

13. Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization, and Military Performance." Roger W. Little, ed., Handbook of Military Institucions (Beverly Hills: Calif., Sage Publications, 1971), p. 297.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 304.

16. While some authors quickly point out that the USSR used women in combat during WWII (Sally L. Groome, "Combat Duty: An Equal Responsibility of Qualified Military Women," Unpublished Thesis, U.S. Naval War College, December 1974, p. 13), other sources indicate that they are no longer used in combat units in the USSR. See U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Women in the Soviet Armed Forces (Washington: March 1976). "At present, women constitute a negligible portion of the Soviet military establishment, perhaps totalling about 10,000 out of an overall force of over four million," p. iv.

17. Samuel Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier, Vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 101.

18. George, p. 303.

19. Women in the Army Study, pp. 12-25, 12-26.

20. I concur with the recommendations made in the Final Task Force Report: Utilization of Women in the Army, June 1977, p. A-3.

> "Assigned to any position in any Army unit except -
> (1) Positions in TOE battalions/squadrons of Armor, Infantry, Field Artillery (cannon, Honest John, Lance), Cavalry, Air Defense (CV and Hawk/Triad), Combat Engineers and Special Forces.
>
> (2) Positions in TOE HQ elements of divisions and divisional or separate infantry or Armor brigades or Cavalry regiments which normally deploy forward of the brigade/regimental trains.
>
> (3) Positions in other battalions, groups, and artillery missile brigades (Perching) which are normally deployed forward of brigade/regimental trains."

21. This argument is also put forth by William L. Hauser, America's Army in Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 201-228.

22. SSGT. Paul E.O'Hara, "Is All-Vol a Success? Let's Ask the Troops!" Army Times, 19 September 1977, p. 14:3.

Chapter V.

1. F. Clifton Berry, Jr., "A General Tells Why the Army is its Own Worst Enemy," Armed Forces Journal International July 1977, p. 22.

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An analysis of the United States Military is conducted by examining the institution and the organizational structure through the conceptual framework of two models. In the first part of the study it is suggested that the United States Military is moving from a "total institution" model to a more civilianized "employer-employee" model. The emergence of the new model may be viewed as a precursor to unionization of the Armed Forces. The organization is also examined in the light of J.D. Thompson's organizational model which is essentially a synthesis of open and closed-system theory. Organizational

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health is maintained by protecting the inner core from the environment. This function is performed by peripheral support agencies which act as buffers between the core and the environment. The model suggests that a functional bifurcation between the core and support units should be formalized. A distribution of the various services between the core and support is presented. Corollaries of the models may have an impact on current issues. In the last section of the study two of the current issues are addressed; unionization and the expanding role of women. The author suggests that union activities be restricted to support units. Furthermore, there are indications that diminishing human resources will necessitate the use of women in combat units.